The last three decades has seen a steady electoral decline in the Volksparteien, culminating in the historically low share of the vote garnered by the CDU/CSU and SPD in the 2009 federal election. Despite this low vote share, and the poor performance of the SPD in particular, this article argues that party system change has in many ways enhanced the coalition options available to the Volksparteien. However, with reference to the notion of path-dependence and the associated role of rules, norms, and beliefs in locking-in standard operating procedures, the article argues that the CDU/CSU is better placed than the SPD to take advantage of these new strategic options. This is because the CDU/CSU has been and remains more capable of shaping German party politics, whereas the SPD has internalised a more reactive role. The article examines why this is the case and discusses how the SPD might overcome path-dependence and, in doing so, transform its strategic prospects.
Article 21 of the Basic Law states that 'political parties shall participate in the formation of the political will of the people' and the Volksparteien, more than other political parties, have internalised this integrative function to such an extent that any perceived loss of public support for them has direct implications for wider system support. A more sanguine view, however, is to regard the decline of the Volkspartei vote as indicative of the emergence in the Federal Republic of a 'fluid party system' 1 , reflecting broader changes in a society that is more diverse, pluralistic, and de-aligned than was the case in the past (see Dalton and Weldon in this Special Issue).
A full coverage of this debate is beyond the scope of this article. The article does, however, work from the somewhat counter-intuitive premise that in strategic terms the changes noted above can potentially enhance the strategic position of the Volksparteien in the coalition game.
This premise has been elaborated on in more depth elsewhere 2 But the reader will note the use of the word potentially. For although we might discern political opportunities within a certain set of structural attributes it cannot be in a deterministic fashion and it is down to political agents to (1) identify these attributes as political opportunities rather than threats; (2) possess the political skills and acumen effectively to pursue these opportunities;
and (3) enjoy sufficient resources (be it political authority, electoral and legislative support, or even sheer luck) to overcome the inevitable constraints on agents' strategic potential. When all three of these factors are in alignment then agents are able to, as it were, 'make the political weather': a point we shall return to in the conclusion to this article. However, to demonstrate how far short of this ideal political agents can fall, consider the fate of the SPD over the period , or its nomination of the decent but uncharismatic Frank-Walter Steinmeier as Chancellor-Candidate -was an extraordinary passivity, bordering on fatalism. In short, unlike the CDU/CSU, the SPD seemed not only unable but also unwilling to make the political weather.
This article explores why this might be the case. It argues that, partly through luck and good fortune, but also through a clearer strategic calculus and an ability to shape political events rather than merely react to them, the CDU/CSU is, and has historically been, a more effective political competitor than the SPD. The key to why this is the case lies in the related notions of institutional lock-in and path-dependence. In short, the article argues that at key junctures in the institutional development of the Federal Republic, the CDU/CSU has not only successfully identified the political opportunities inherent within these junctures but also possessed the political acumen and resources to pursue those opportunities. It will be argued that such junctures, such as during the period of Allied Occupation and subsequent foundation of the Federal Republic or the collapse of the GDR regime and subsequent unification process, not only set up or re-enforced a set of institutional structures, but also buttressed the beliefs, rules, norms, and standard operating procedures (SOPs) that underpin those structures and mould their development going forward. Thus, in playing the decisive role in these junctures and the early moves associated with them, the CDU/CSU was not only better placed to work with the grain of institutional practice going forward but also to shape or, when necessary, even break with patterns of path-dependence. By contrast, and with the important exception of Brandt's Ostpolitik, the SPD was forced into and, it is argued, has internalised and continues to pursue a reactive role within the Federal Republic's political system. In the language of Wolfgang Streeck and Kathleen Thelen, therefore, the CDU/CSU are more often than not the 'rule makers', whilst the SPD tend to be the 'rule takers' 6 .
The rest of the article is structured as follows. In the next section, the notion of pathdependence and its impact on institutional agents is discussed. Through reference to the evolutionary economics literature, I adapt a framework of path dependence that is not overdeterministic, allows for significant political agency and change, and develop an organising narrative that is used later in the article. Second, the article provides an historic overview of the roles of the Volksparteien within this rule making/rule taking format and builds upon the point made above about the SPD's reactive role in German politics. Third, I return to our framework of path dependence and a discussion about the persistence of SOPs, which actors they benefit and why, and how, in the context of the SPD's relative strategic weakness, path-dependence might be overcome by political agents.
INSTITUTIONS, PATH-DEPENDENCE AND POLITICAL AGENCY
There is no agreement as to the manner in which agents interact with institutions. Rational actor-centred approaches 7 regard institutions as artefacts of 'congealed tastes' 8 or, in those accounts where institutional context is more privileged, as 'prescriptions' for strategic action 9 .
Such 'thin' accounts of institutions have parsimonial elegance but, for students of German politics, they force us to discount too much of the warp and weft of politics in the Federal
Republic that make our field of study so rich. On the other hand, constructivist, sociological, and normative institutionalist approaches reverse the polarity of analysis and foreground established practices, beliefs, and values as profound constraints on agency. This notion of a 'logic of appropriateness' 10 is intuitive and plausible but also imposes a priori limits on the extent of transformative change brought about by strategic actors within institutional settings. In the context of the study of German politics it is, as it where, the reification of the Sonderweg narrative and therefore equally unhelpful.
In addition, although both the rational choice and normative institutionalist approaches have analytical power they attach little importance to how and why institutional settings, principles, and practices emerged in the Federal Republic, for instance, in the first place. Insights from the Europeanisation literature 11 , for example, demonstrate that institutional consolidation and change is complex and non-linear, marked by a 'complex causality'
12
.
We find similar degrees of nuance within historical institutionalist narratives 13 in which institutions' evolution 14 is occasionally marked by 'punctuations' or junctures in which 'rapid bursts of change [are] followed by long periods of stasis'. 15 Thus these accounts stress how the practices -and the rules, norms, and beliefs in which they are embedded -that are in place at the time of institutional formation persist over the long run. As a result SOPs develop that serve to routinise activities and cultivate incremental rather than fundamental change. This incremental process is not, however, set in stone and we can observe junctures in which institutions undergo rapid change. Thus, despite a bias towards inertia, institutions do adapt over time, either because of changes in the external environment, and changes in internal perceptions of the real or perceived performance of such institutions in the context of the environment in which they operate. Nevertheless, it requires agency -be it individual or collective, goal-directed or dispersed and cumulative -to over overcome path-dependency.
This understanding of path-dependency is not a fatalistic and/or deterministic notion in which structure inevitably takes precedence to agency. In fact, a careful reading of the notion of pathdependency reveals a marked leaning towards the contingent over the deterministic. The concept is associated with evolutionary economics 16 , which challenges the neo-classical paradigm of market clearance and utility maximising individuals. In doing so, it argues that markets -as the aggregate of agents' actions -make errors in their choice of products and that these initial errors are 'locked in' through a process of 'positive feedback'. 17 And although the notion of lock-in implies sub-optimal collective outcomes, it does not necessarily imply irrational choices on the part of agents, given the incentives and information available to them.
In order to operationise the notion of path-dependence in the context of Volkspartei adaptation and strategy, the article draws upon the debates covered above and makes the distinction between 'structure-driven' and 'rule-driven' path dependence. 18 . Structure-driven path dependence, as the name implies, exists where existing structures impact on the choice and evolution of subsequent structures. This might be for reasons of efficiency or because of rent seeking on the part of agents. And in the case of rent seeking, the incentives to retain the status quo are powerful, even when it is clear that the institution has ceased to be efficient. Similarly, rule-driven path dependence exists when the emergence of rules and practices is shaped by existing power relationships and their path-dependence is grounded either in reasons of efficiency or because public-regarding decisions are thwarted by interest group politics. For the purpose of our analysis, our notion of rules is expanded to include informal rules, norms, practices and SOPs, in so far as they can be judged to have a material effect on party competition and coalition outcomes. The two types of path dependence and the reasons for their persistence are summarised in Table One.   TABLE ONE For as long as the positive feedback between party, state, and society was maintained there was no need to challenge established SOPs. Thus, up until the late 1960s, the CDU/CSU remained little more than a Kanzlerwahlverein (party that existed to elect the Chancellor) rather than the professionalised party organisation it is today.
What is striking, however, is that when the CDU/CSU went into opposition in 1969 it was relatively quick, despite being an organisation with a record of success behind it and therefore a strong narrative and rationale to defend SOPs, to react to failure and adapt to the new circumstances. This process actually began before 1969, with the formulation of the Berlin
Programme of 1967/8, and continued through the 1973 Hamburg conference to the adoption of the 1978 Basic Programme. In a pattern that would be repeated again at the time of unification, the CDU either implicitly accepted or explicitly co-opted those elements of the 1970s Federal Republic (such as growing social diversity or the process of Ostpolitik) that it could not change and, in as far as it could, made them its own. And in terms of organisational renewal, the CDU moved away from the previously loose union of state parties towards a more professional and centralised structure. As a result of this organisation renewal, the party's Federal Executive and Federal Committee were given enhanced powers and the General Secretary was provided with a well resourced central apparatus which not only possessed co-ordinating capacity but also a policy-making function. In addition, party financing was restructured and there was a push to increase and extend the scope of party membership. 22 As a result, when the CDU returned to government in 1982 it possessed an efficient party machine and had boosted its membership from around 400,000 to over 750,000. 23 Moving on a decade, the CDU's reactive capacity and morphogenetic qualities was also demonstrated in its response to the collapse of the Communist regime in the GDR. On the face of it, this looked like an uphill task. At the start of the process, the incumbent Black-Yellow coalition, led by Helmut Kohl, was unpopular, about to enter a federal election year and under increasing pressure from a resurgent SPD. In addition, the CDU's eponymous sister party in the GDR was part of the so-called 'block-party' system and, as a result, was deeply implicated both collectively and individually in the injustices of the old GDR regime. Yet, the CDU -and
Chancellor Kohl in particular -showed an unexpected capacity to seize upon and shape events. In the economics literature from which our framework is derived, an accepted notion of efficiency is that of 'Pareto optimality', used to describe situations in which any change that is made to make any agent better off is impossible without making another agent worse off. 30 Under conditions of Pareto Optimality, any changes to the status quo of agents' welfare distributions would require the consent of all agents within the institution and possibly, where agents would be worse off in welfare terms, require their compensation as well.
Without pursuing this argument to any great length, we can see how this notion of efficiency in the broad structures and power relations of the Federal Republic would constrain the SPD's options. As already noted, the SPD had little leverage over the early moves in the institutional development of the Federal Republic and its initial opposition to many of its key features, including the division of Germany, the Federal Republic's western orientation and the socialmarket economy, led to a series of defeats in federal elections. As a result, it had to undergo the process of adaptation that culminated in the Bad Godesberg Programme. Moreover, by the time the SPD had become the senior partner in the Federal Government in 1969, even the newest of these structures were at least two decades old and reasonably embedded and efficient. Thus, even if the SPD was minded to -and, for reasons to be discussed below, it was not so mindedthere was no chance of the party winning the consent of all key political agents in any transformative change.
By contrast, the arguments for the efficiency of rule-driven path-dependence are weaker, particularly with regard to those rules that shape and structure political competition. Formal rules that help determine outcomes obviously include Germany's Mixed Member Proportional
Voting System (MMP), and the 'five per cent barrier' to representation, as well as various constitutional constraints upon party organisation and activity 31 and also encompasses all of the principles or regulations governing the conduct, actions, procedures, and arrangements that underpin the process through which parties seek votes and office. And, if we do regard political parties as vote-and office-seeking, then a good proxy indicator of parties' welfare are the Table Two.   TABLE TWO If we are to move towards a fuller understanding of path-dependency in German party politics, therefore, we must look beyond the notion of efficiency to the more agential explanations posited in our framework: those of rent-seeking and interest-group politics. As already discussed, the incentives to continue rent seeking are powerful, even when institutional efficiency is in decline. Similar incentives are at work when public-regarding decisions to break pathdependence are thwarted by interest group politics.
First, let us consider rent-seeking. The rationale for, and evidence of, rent-seeking by political parties in most polities is fairly self-evident 35 . In the Federal Republic, however, there are a number of historical conditions that make the incentives for rent-seeking particularly strong. As Democrats were often the governing party and achieved significant penetration of senior civil service and other public positions. 38 Under such circumstances, even prolonged periods of opposition at the federal level were not without their compensations. 39 Many of the arguments behind the notion of rent-seeking as a buffer of structure-driven pathdependence are straightforward and have been put forward in a different form in Katz and Mair's notion of the 'Cartel-party'. 40 More difficult to establish is the second notion of interestgroup politics as a buffer for rule-driven path-dependence. We have already mentioned the more formal rules that shape political competition in the Federal Republic. However, a recent comparative analysis of coalition outcomes in Germany and New Zealand (a country with an MMP system modelled on Germany's and a similar distribution of party weights), drawing upon the coalition theory literature, identified a number of more informal rules, norms and SOPs that had a material effect on coalition outcomes. These include (1) the absence or presence of a rule or norm regarding majority rule, (2) a tendency towards minimum-connected winning coalitions, (3) the presence within coalitions of the party controlling the median legislator within the legislature, and (4) the key role of the party controlling the median legislator within the coalition.
In the German case, (1), (3), and (4) This is not without its electoral risks but would be preferable to the SPD's only other coalition option at present or in the near future: another surplus majority Grand Coalition.
So to sum up, although interest group politics buffer rule-driven path-dependence they are not an insurmountable barrier to change. In order to break with path-dependence the SPD must display the same capacity for political agency shown by the CDU, for instance when it co-opted its sister party in the GDR, despite the latter's long-standing and ongoing links with the Communist regime. An active and constructive engagement with the Left Party 20 years after the fall of the GDR is relatively orthodox by comparison and for the SPD would be a first step along the road back to political power on its own terms.
CONCLUSION
This article has worked from the premise that, despite a steady decline in the Volkspartei vote, and the poor performance of the SPD in particular, party system change has in many ways enhanced the coalition options available to the Volksparteien. It works from the argument that, despite the relative electoral strength of the CDU/CSU and SPD in the 1960s and 1970s, they were nearly always forced to bargain with the FDP, which acted as the 'kingmaker' within the party system and consequently was decisive in the coalition game. By contrast, the article argues that under the current more fluid conditions, the Volksparteien are in principle less vulnerable to threats of a decisive defection by small parties to alternative coalitions. This has generated more strategic options for the Volksparteien, albeit options that the CDU/CSU is better placed to take advantage of than the SPD. This is because the CDU/CSU has been and remains more capable of shaping German party politics, whereas the SPD has internalised a more reactive role, for the reasons -related to the persistence of structure-driven and rule-driven path-dependencediscussed above.
So where does this leave us? It will be recalled that at the start of this article I argued that, when strategic opportunities arise, political agents must be able to (1) identify these as opportunities rather than threats; (2) possess the political skills and acumen effectively to pursue them; and (3) enjoy sufficient resources to overcome constraints on agents' strategic potential. I argued that when all three of these factors are in alignment then agents can 'make the political weather'.
When they are not, as the current predicament of the SPD demonstrates, then all bets are off.
There are, however, two additional points that are worth bearing in mind. First, although the SPD's failure is undeniable, it is not necessarily worse than the failure suffered by many centreleft parties in advanced democracies. Indeed, with the exception of the Australian Labor Party (ALP) and, it might be argued, the US Democrats, very few such parties have benefited from the global financial crisis, regardless of whether they have been incumbents or in opposition.
Moreover, with the exception of the ALP or the Swedish Social Democrats, most centre-left parties in advanced democracies have tended to be reactive and adaptive rather than take on the role of proactive institutional architects. One might argue that such a reactive role is, as it were, one of the features that define social democracy. 46 The second point is that all but the most 'vulgar' readings of path-dependence allow for the change and the potential for agents to shape and, under certain circumstances, transform the institutional environment within which they operate. Clearly, this is empirically the case and is not a lesson that the CDU/CSU has had to learn. It is, however, one that the SPD must more fully take on board if it is once more to become a progressive force in German politics. Like the CDU/CSU, the SPD must learn to show a little less respect for the institutional setting in which it operates and a little less deference towards the rules, norms, beliefs and practices that hold it back. 
